The Gorsuch nomination

This is to suggest that Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell take no action to end the use of the filibuster as weapon to block Supreme Court appointments.  If the Gorsuch nomination fails by reason of a Democratic filibuster, so be it.  Republicans then have a persuasive issue for the 2018 elections, with the aim of gaining no less than a 60-seat Senate majority in January 2019.

President Trump, with the defeat of the Gorsuch appointment, should then make another Supreme Court nomination from his list of judges.  If the Democrats filibuster this second nomination, the persuasive argument for a Senate of no less than 60 Republicans in January 2019 takes on an a fortiori aspect.  Note that a Senate with no fewer than 60 Republicans should be capable of demolishing Democrat obstructionism.

Alternatively, a "deal" comes to mind – a deal that must be based on a tacit understanding in the Senate, to avoid acknowledgment of horse-trading concerning the above-the-political-fray Supreme Court: Judge Gorsuch now, Judge Garland later – to replace either Justice Ginsburg or Justice Breyer.  This "deal" should not bar the GOP from seeking a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate for 2019.

By the way, this observer would look forward to the Garland hearings.  Would the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee suddenly turn on Garland should he refuse to declare that he would, indeed, rule to overturn the Citizens United decision?

This is to suggest that Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell take no action to end the use of the filibuster as weapon to block Supreme Court appointments.  If the Gorsuch nomination fails by reason of a Democratic filibuster, so be it.  Republicans then have a persuasive issue for the 2018 elections, with the aim of gaining no less than a 60-seat Senate majority in January 2019.

President Trump, with the defeat of the Gorsuch appointment, should then make another Supreme Court nomination from his list of judges.  If the Democrats filibuster this second nomination, the persuasive argument for a Senate of no less than 60 Republicans in January 2019 takes on an a fortiori aspect.  Note that a Senate with no fewer than 60 Republicans should be capable of demolishing Democrat obstructionism.

Alternatively, a "deal" comes to mind – a deal that must be based on a tacit understanding in the Senate, to avoid acknowledgment of horse-trading concerning the above-the-political-fray Supreme Court: Judge Gorsuch now, Judge Garland later – to replace either Justice Ginsburg or Justice Breyer.  This "deal" should not bar the GOP from seeking a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate for 2019.

By the way, this observer would look forward to the Garland hearings.  Would the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee suddenly turn on Garland should he refuse to declare that he would, indeed, rule to overturn the Citizens United decision?