Newest Nonsense: Hu JintaoToo Weak To Do America's Bidding!

The New York Times continues to look for ways to justify the continued appeasement of Communist China. With President Hu Jintao coming to Washington for a state visit Wednesday, there is a need in liberal establishment circles to downplay expectations that the summit with President Barack Obama will make any progress on the many issues that are making Sino-American relations more contentious.

The latest ploy is today's article by David Sanger and Michael Wines in which it is argued,

American officials have spent years urging Mr. Hu to revalue China's currency, rein in North Korea, ease up on dissidents and crack down on the copying of American technology, and they have felt at times that Mr. Hu agreed to address their concerns. But those problems have festered, and after first wondering if the Chinese leader was simply deflecting them or deceiving them, President Obama's top advisers have concluded that Mr. Hu is often at the mercy of a diffuse ruling party in which generals, ministers and big corporate interests have more clout, and less deference, than they did in the days of Mao or Deng Xiaoping, who commanded basically unquestioned authority.

In other words, Hu is too weak to seek the compromises with Obama that he might personally desire. But what proof is there that Hu is any less committed to China's rise to great power status and the overturning of U.S. "hegemony" than were Mao and Deng?  There is none. Hu built his power base on the People's Liberation Army, as did Mao and Deng. It is under Hu that Chinese industry is making major strides forward.  "National champion" firms are being created to push foreign competitors either out of the Chinese market or into even more subservient roles as junior partners in so-called joint ventures.  This is the fulfillment of the "four modernizations" Deng set as strategic economic policy. And Beijing's international influence is rising steadily as its wealth grows.

For Hu, the issues raised by U.S. officials are not problems to be solved, but advantages to be maintained.

The Communist regime's new 5-year plan calls for continued integration of the civilian and defense industrial sectors and 15 percent annual growth rates in military output. Hu has pushed for a renewal of Marxist doctrinal training among party cadres. If there is a difference between Hu and Deng, it is that under Hu, China has become more assertive and less concerned about provoking a backlash from an America still reeling from an economic crisis.

Hu's rejection of U.S. "urgings" to change policies that benefit China is a sign of strength, not weakness. It is Washington's failure to back its "urgings" with actions that could actually redress its grievances with Beijing that sends a message of appeasement that encourages not only Hu but his successors that they do not have to change course.

The New York Times continues to look for ways to justify the continued appeasement of Communist China. With President Hu Jintao coming to Washington for a state visit Wednesday, there is a need in liberal establishment circles to downplay expectations that the summit with President Barack Obama will make any progress on the many issues that are making Sino-American relations more contentious.

The latest ploy is today's article by David Sanger and Michael Wines in which it is argued,

American officials have spent years urging Mr. Hu to revalue China's currency, rein in North Korea, ease up on dissidents and crack down on the copying of American technology, and they have felt at times that Mr. Hu agreed to address their concerns. But those problems have festered, and after first wondering if the Chinese leader was simply deflecting them or deceiving them, President Obama's top advisers have concluded that Mr. Hu is often at the mercy of a diffuse ruling party in which generals, ministers and big corporate interests have more clout, and less deference, than they did in the days of Mao or Deng Xiaoping, who commanded basically unquestioned authority.

In other words, Hu is too weak to seek the compromises with Obama that he might personally desire. But what proof is there that Hu is any less committed to China's rise to great power status and the overturning of U.S. "hegemony" than were Mao and Deng?  There is none. Hu built his power base on the People's Liberation Army, as did Mao and Deng. It is under Hu that Chinese industry is making major strides forward.  "National champion" firms are being created to push foreign competitors either out of the Chinese market or into even more subservient roles as junior partners in so-called joint ventures.  This is the fulfillment of the "four modernizations" Deng set as strategic economic policy. And Beijing's international influence is rising steadily as its wealth grows.

For Hu, the issues raised by U.S. officials are not problems to be solved, but advantages to be maintained.

The Communist regime's new 5-year plan calls for continued integration of the civilian and defense industrial sectors and 15 percent annual growth rates in military output. Hu has pushed for a renewal of Marxist doctrinal training among party cadres. If there is a difference between Hu and Deng, it is that under Hu, China has become more assertive and less concerned about provoking a backlash from an America still reeling from an economic crisis.

Hu's rejection of U.S. "urgings" to change policies that benefit China is a sign of strength, not weakness. It is Washington's failure to back its "urgings" with actions that could actually redress its grievances with Beijing that sends a message of appeasement that encourages not only Hu but his successors that they do not have to change course.