PrintThe UN, Al-Tuwaitha, and nukes
There were several reports published on October 12, about the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) throwing another fit about the state of affairs at Saddam's former nuclear research center at Al—Tuwaitha. In my last report concerning Tuwaitha, I described how the so—called nuclear watchdog was upset that the US had shipped about 1.8 tons of low—enriched uranium and other radioactive material out of Iraq for disposition in the US.
Now, the legacy media states that the IAEA is concerned that equipment that could be used to develop nuclear—grade material are missing from the research facility. A CNN report says,
IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei said that though some radioactive equipment taken from Iraq after the war began has shown up in other countries, none of the high—quality, dual—use equipment or materials that is missing has been found.
The admission from the IAEA that the missing equipment is dual—use and could have been used to manufacture nuclear fuel is significant because of the obvious questions it raises about the IAEA's ability to enforce the Non—Proliferation Treaty (NPT). CNN's actually publishing this fact is another shocker.
Reuters, however, never fails to disappoint. It downplays the importance of this equipment by saying,
The IAEA reported on Monday that neither Baghdad nor Washington appeared to have noticed the disappearance of nuclear equipment and materials once closely monitored by the agency.[emphasis mine]
This belated realization that nuclear equipment has 'disappeared' from Tuwaitha only reinforces my report from this past July where I said,
The actions, or more appropriately, the inactions of the IAEA regarding Iraq since the end of Gulf War I, betray the agency's true agenda. Rather than inspect, report, and implement restrictions in accordance with the provisions in the treaty, the agency has in effect become an enabler of rogue nations who are attempting, or who have already succeeded in developing or acquiring special nuclear material and equipment. In other words, the IAEA is simply a reflection of its parent organization, which routinely delays and obfuscates the efforts of the US and the UK in controlling banned substances and delivery systems.
The sudden discovery that equipment was missing means that the IAEA had detailed inventories of the materials and equipment to compare the pre—Iraq War status of the site with the current status of the equipment. In fact, the agency was permitted back on the facility in June of 2003 to review the condition of the facility and the materials stored there. But just as with the 500 tons of yellowcake that still remains at Tuwaitha, and the nearly two tons of low—enriched uranium that was shipped out to the US for safekeeping this summer, this 'dual—use' equipment was apparently kept in Iraq only for peaceful research purposes. But, just as I said last July,
All of this begs the question: why did the IAEA allow Iraq to retain such massive amounts of nuclear material, when its three nuclear facilities had been destroyed over 12 years ago, and have never been repaired? In fact, the Russian reactor is so hot, it would take years to clean up the facility; it's a total write off. Iraq had no legitimate reason to have possessed the yellowcake.
And Iraq had no legitimate reason to have possessed dual—use equipment or facilities for fuel production for these useless reactors either. The IAEA is fond of reminding us that all of these materials and equipment were 'under the control and supervision of the IAEA,' or 'under IAEA seal and control.' However, the agency inspected these seals and the equipment only once per year. How in the world was the NPT supposed to be enforced with a once—per—year inspection regimen? The only sure—fire way to maintain these restrictions was to have shipped all of these stocks of banned substances and equipment out of the country 12 years ago. There is no indication that the IAEA is even interested in the possibility that Saddam may have been trying to conduct enrichment by calutron at alternate facilities such as Tarmiya and al—Fajar.
Admittedly, the security at Tuwaitha immediately after the fall of Baghdad was spotty at best. Saddam's security services deserted days before the lead elements of the Coalition even got close to the site, and looting continued to be a problem through the summer except around key sites secured by US forces. But looters don't abscond with entire facilities and their inner workings.
The latest flap with the IAEA means just one thing: they and their partners in Saddam's former Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency have been caught — again. The UN is showing the world how ineffective they have been in implementing the provisions of the NPT. Their primary consideration is job security, so they must maintain access to rogue nation facilities in order to simply 'check the box' on their inspections. This means they will ignore or even cooperate with dictators who support terrorists.
The head of the new Iraqi Science and Technology Ministry, Rashad Omar, is confident that all materials are accounted for, since the security of the facility had been firmly established last year,
'We are transparent. We are happy for the IAEA or any other organization to come and inspect"
This reassurance means the 'missing' facilities are more than likely undergoing a thorough examination in a safe location.
By the way, who supplied the satellite photos of Tuwaitha to the IAEA anyway?
Douglas Hanson was the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Science and Technology for the Coalition Provisional Authority during the Summer of 2003. As then, the Iraqi—controlled ministry today has oversight of Al—Tuwaitha and its 3000 scientists and engineers of the now—disbanded Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.
