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"There is no doubt in my mind that Iraq has a much stronger BW [biological weapons] program today than it had in 1990."
"the Commission has no confidence that all bulk agents have been destroyed; that no BW munitions or weapons remain in Iraq; and that a BW capability does not exist in Iraq".
"Thirteen German companies are suspected of having assisted Iraq in building nuclear facilities and developing its Scud missile program. Illegal exports from Germany to Iraq include missile parts, aluminum pipes for producing gas ultracentrifuges, and design plans for nuclear technology."
"If they get the materials, they can make a bomb. If they get a bomb, they're going to use it."
Do you shrug at former Iraq nuclear inspector David Albright and Khidhir Hamza, "Saddam's Bombmaker"?"BND says it has evidence to suggest the following: Iraq has resumed its nuclear programme and may be capable of producing an atomic bomb in three years"
"Our conclusion is that Iraq could make a nuclear device within two to 12 months after deciding to do so, assuming it acquired sufficient fissile material. We also believe that the more probable time is closer to two months if HEU[Highly Enriched Uranium] is obtained"
"The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world.
"The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government - a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people.
"If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at his neighbors. He will make war on his own people.
"And mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use them. "
"We can have debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile of WMD and of mid- and long-range missiles. But no one can doubt the record of Iraqi violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions, one after another, and for 12 long years.
"And no one can doubt that the Iraqi dictator's intentions have not changed. He wants weapons of mass destruction as clearly as he wants to remain in power."
"The issue is not whether Iraq has yet achieved nuclear weapons or extremely lethal biological weapons. It is that this regime will eventually acquire nuclear weapons and biological weapons with equal or greater lethality if it is given the time and opportunity to do so. It will not change character or somehow enter the mythical ‘family of nations.'"
"the inspectors are saying that even if they could stay in Iraq, their work would be a sham.
"Saddam's deception has defeated their effectiveness. Instead of the inspectors disarming Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors.
"This situation presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere. The international community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has failed to seize the chance."
"Even if a new, more aggressive U.N. inspection regime is eventually allowed back inside Iraq, inspectors ‘cannot hope to detect a covert biological program with nuclear lethalities, and they cannot hope to prevent Iraq from assembling a nuclear device if it can obtain fissile or ‘dirty' fissile material from outside Iraq,' Cordesman said. ‘In fact, efforts directed at large, observable Iraqi CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear] and missile activities may simply push Iraq into concentrating on biological weapons and asymmetrical means of delivery.'"
"Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance - not even today - of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace."
"Inspection is not a game of ‘catch as catch can.'"
"Regrettably, the 12,000 page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number."
"Iraq mocked the United Nations with its declaration. It rejected what the Security Council, in Resolution 1441, insisted it must do - that is, answer all outstanding questions about the program. And it had the gall to contend that it hasn't had a prohibited weapons program since the end of the Gulf War."
"Even a week ago, when the current quarterly report was finalized, there was still relatively little tangible progress to note."
"the long list of proscribed items unaccounted for and as such resulting in unresolved disarmament issues was not shortened either by the inspections or by Iraqi declarations and documentation."
"The resolution does not call for them to go snooping all over Iraq to see what they can find; the resolution puts the burden not on the inspectors but on Saddam Hussein to come forward, complete declaration, full cooperation, and telling us everything that has been going on in Baghdad and throughout Iraq, lo these many years, with respect to weapons of mass destruction. If he were to do that, if he had done it over the years, but especially in the weeks since [UN Resolution] 1441, here's what we used to do, we're not doing it now, you can audit it, here's what we have left, and we haven't told you about it before, we're telling you now, here is the difference between what you think we have and what we actually have, and here is how we account for those differences - if that had been his attitude, we'd be in a different situation; that has not been his attitude. He still thinks that he can string out this process and escape the judgment of the international community. And the international community cannot allow that to happen."
"Once the danger has fully materialized, evident to all, mobilizing action is easier-but it then may be too late."