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December 5, 2010 Would you board a plane which had a 5 percent chance of crashing?
In the article Israel's Missile Defense: The New Strategic Factor in the Middle East Barry Rubin, director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center of the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel, writes:
Many, unconsciously perhaps thinking of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War balance, misunderstand this system's effectiveness. Of course, they point out, even if one nuclear missile gets through that would still be catastrophic. But this neglects three factors.However, Bernard Lewis in his 2006 article in the Wall Street Journal wrote: For people with this mindset, MAD [mutual assured destruction] is not a constraint; it is an inducement." What this means is that the above first three points would make sense if Iran's leaders were rational, but not if, as Bernard Lewis believes, they would be induced by the prospect of mutual assured destruction, in other words when they would be looking forward to triggering a nuclear war. Barry Rubin takes this possibility into account as well: Certainly, it is possible that Iran's regime (or a faction there that might fire missiles without full government approval) would ignore the rational fear of being devastated in return. Yet by maximizing this certainty, the possibility of the Iranian regime ignoring the danger is minimized.I understood that by "maximizing this certainty" Rubin meant the certainty of Iran being devastated in return and everything that should be done on our part to maximize that certainty so that Iran could not ignore it, and know exactly what to expect. But if Iran's regime were irrational this would just increase their desire to start a nuclear war even more. Iran would not be ignoring the danger since to them it is not danger but salvation. It would be exactly what they believe they need for the return of the Mahdi. So the whole analysis hinges on the probability of the Iranian regime being irrational. If this probability were negligible then all the discussion of making sure that Iran knows the consequences of a nuclear exchange and the strength of Israel's defense would make sense. However, if the probability of Iran's regime being irrational is NOT negligible then the function becomes an inverse function, i.e. the measures which would prevent Iran from starting a war if it were rational have, de facto, the opposite effect if the regime were irrational. Let's assume that the probability of Iran's regime being irrational is 5 percent. Since the "weight factor", i.e. the scale of peril associated with this probability is horrendous there is no point in discussing all the other negative consequences that arise with Iran having nuclear weapons. Would you board a plane which would have a 5 percent chance of crashing? Would you be worried about whether there would be someone at the destination airport waiting for you so you would not need to look for a taxi? Or would the 5 percent probability make you not board the plane and make sure nobody else does? Barry Rubin concludes As I've previously pointed out, Israel is unlikely to attack Iran to stop it from getting nuclear weapons. The lack of international support and the difficulty of launching such a mission without an imminent threat, among other factors, inhibit such an operation. "If there is a real threat that the regime will launch missiles against Israel " writes Rubin. There is no IF. The not negligible probability that the Iranian regime may be irrational is the real threat! |
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