More on the 'no-jihad zone'

Don't be surprised by LTC Kilcullen's comments.  They are not at all uncommon.  While opinions of the Iraqi military among soldiers and Marines vary widely, generally according to when their tours were and how closely they dealt with the Iraqis, you must remember that they and Kilcullen have been fighting alongside Muslims who are fighting Muslim Jihadists, and who (although you will never know it from the MSM coverage) are taking considerably heavier casualties than we are. 

The quality of Iraqi units across the board is far better than it was two years ago, and they are also, on average, more capable of independent operations.  And, no, I don't have current figures on this.  The last ones I've seen are many months old, and my comments here are based on the observations of returning field grade officers and a smattering of junior officers and enlisteds.

It is a testament to the strength of the MSM that even people who generally support our campaign in Iraq are oblivious to the fact that their vague perceptions of the Iraqi military are largely formed by the MSM.  Even with the surge, we have relatively few troops in Iraq, and we certainly wouldn't be accomplishing anywhere near as much, and suffering as few casualties as we are, without the active support of -- the Iraqis.

In short, the strained gymnastics of the British government, and to a much lesser degree our own leaders in Washington, should not be confused with the operational setting that soldiers and Marines work within daily in Iraq, or for that matter, Afghanistan and even the southern Philippines and the Balkans.


D. M. Giangreco has written numerous books and articles, and is an occasional contributor to American Thinker.
Don't be surprised by LTC Kilcullen's comments.  They are not at all uncommon.  While opinions of the Iraqi military among soldiers and Marines vary widely, generally according to when their tours were and how closely they dealt with the Iraqis, you must remember that they and Kilcullen have been fighting alongside Muslims who are fighting Muslim Jihadists, and who (although you will never know it from the MSM coverage) are taking considerably heavier casualties than we are. 

The quality of Iraqi units across the board is far better than it was two years ago, and they are also, on average, more capable of independent operations.  And, no, I don't have current figures on this.  The last ones I've seen are many months old, and my comments here are based on the observations of returning field grade officers and a smattering of junior officers and enlisteds.

It is a testament to the strength of the MSM that even people who generally support our campaign in Iraq are oblivious to the fact that their vague perceptions of the Iraqi military are largely formed by the MSM.  Even with the surge, we have relatively few troops in Iraq, and we certainly wouldn't be accomplishing anywhere near as much, and suffering as few casualties as we are, without the active support of -- the Iraqis.

In short, the strained gymnastics of the British government, and to a much lesser degree our own leaders in Washington, should not be confused with the operational setting that soldiers and Marines work within daily in Iraq, or for that matter, Afghanistan and even the southern Philippines and the Balkans.


D. M. Giangreco has written numerous books and articles, and is an occasional contributor to American Thinker.