Libby's Reply to the Appellate Court on Bond Pending Appeal

At the close of business today, Lewis Libby filed his response to the Fitzgerald response to his Application for Release Pending Appeal (and to the supplemental 30 page opinion Judge Walton entered after the bond hearing. 

It is short and and easy to  read. Let me tempt you to do so by setting forth the first paragraph, something that should be a model to all legal writers for its succinct and persuasive presentation of this argument:
"When a Special Counsel is directed to exercise the "plenary" authority of the Attorney General "independent of' anyone's "supervision or control"; is exempted from the "limit[s]" of 28 C.F.R. Part 600 (which include the duty to "comply" with DOJ "rules" and "policies"); is authorized to prosecute any violation he deems "related to" his original mandate; and discharges CIPA authority that Congress reserved only to the actual Attorney General and a narrow set of other high-level officers not including the Special Counsel or U.S. Attorneys, surely it is a "close" question whether he is a "principal" officer. Special Counsel Fitzgerald, backed by Judge Walton's .30-page post-hearing memorandum ("Mem"), contends otherwise, but does so unpersuasively. "

At the close of business today, Lewis Libby filed his response to the Fitzgerald response to his Application for Release Pending Appeal (and to the supplemental 30 page opinion Judge Walton entered after the bond hearing. 

It is short and and easy to  read. Let me tempt you to do so by setting forth the first paragraph, something that should be a model to all legal writers for its succinct and persuasive presentation of this argument:
"When a Special Counsel is directed to exercise the "plenary" authority of the Attorney General "independent of' anyone's "supervision or control"; is exempted from the "limit[s]" of 28 C.F.R. Part 600 (which include the duty to "comply" with DOJ "rules" and "policies"); is authorized to prosecute any violation he deems "related to" his original mandate; and discharges CIPA authority that Congress reserved only to the actual Attorney General and a narrow set of other high-level officers not including the Special Counsel or U.S. Attorneys, surely it is a "close" question whether he is a "principal" officer. Special Counsel Fitzgerald, backed by Judge Walton's .30-page post-hearing memorandum ("Mem"), contends otherwise, but does so unpersuasively. "