Muddled thinking from David Ignatius

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Washington Post columnist David Ignatius believes that the lessons to be learned from the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the peace efforts that followed can be simplistically summarized as: the Egyptians needed a measure of self—respect derived from some kind of victory over Israel and that Israel needed to be humbled by a defeat to be prepared to make peace.

This is not a formula for success with Hezbollah.

Egypt wanted the Sinai desert to be returned to Egypt after it was captured in the 1967 War. Anwar Sadat was driven by nationalistic reasons: to make Egypt "whole" and to gain a measure of renown in the Arab world for attacking Israel.  He did not expect to defeat Israel and win the entire Sinai back in battle, but to win a few miles of the desert, and then through negotiations get more back. By this point in time, Sadat had given up on Nasser's goal of destroying Israel.

Hezbollah has made clear that their goal is the elimination of Israel and they are driven by religious extremism. There are no land issues involved: Israel was certified as being completely out of Lebanon by no less than the United Nations, not an institution known to be friendly towards Israel.

Hezbollah will not be sated by pushing Israel off any purported Lebanese land, simply because there is no such land for Israel to turn over to them. The demand for Shebaa Farms is a joke. it was captured by Israel in the Six Day War in 1967 from Syria and is part of the Golan Heights. Furthermore, there is not a nationalistic basis for Hezbollah. The group is nominally Lebanese but is actually a proxy for Iran. Hezbollah does not care about the destruction of Lebanon, nor the deaths of Lebanese civilians, and probably welcomes both as a way to gain recruits and establish control of a weakened Lebanese government.

Sadat had the Egyptian people's welfare in mind when he was courageous enough to make peace with Israel. Can anyone imagine Nasrallah, the Hezbollah head, coming into Jerusalem to address the Knesset, as Sadat did?

Richard Baehr and Ed Lasky   8 02 06

Washington Post columnist David Ignatius believes that the lessons to be learned from the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the peace efforts that followed can be simplistically summarized as: the Egyptians needed a measure of self—respect derived from some kind of victory over Israel and that Israel needed to be humbled by a defeat to be prepared to make peace.

This is not a formula for success with Hezbollah.

Egypt wanted the Sinai desert to be returned to Egypt after it was captured in the 1967 War. Anwar Sadat was driven by nationalistic reasons: to make Egypt "whole" and to gain a measure of renown in the Arab world for attacking Israel.  He did not expect to defeat Israel and win the entire Sinai back in battle, but to win a few miles of the desert, and then through negotiations get more back. By this point in time, Sadat had given up on Nasser's goal of destroying Israel.

Hezbollah has made clear that their goal is the elimination of Israel and they are driven by religious extremism. There are no land issues involved: Israel was certified as being completely out of Lebanon by no less than the United Nations, not an institution known to be friendly towards Israel.

Hezbollah will not be sated by pushing Israel off any purported Lebanese land, simply because there is no such land for Israel to turn over to them. The demand for Shebaa Farms is a joke. it was captured by Israel in the Six Day War in 1967 from Syria and is part of the Golan Heights. Furthermore, there is not a nationalistic basis for Hezbollah. The group is nominally Lebanese but is actually a proxy for Iran. Hezbollah does not care about the destruction of Lebanon, nor the deaths of Lebanese civilians, and probably welcomes both as a way to gain recruits and establish control of a weakened Lebanese government.

Sadat had the Egyptian people's welfare in mind when he was courageous enough to make peace with Israel. Can anyone imagine Nasrallah, the Hezbollah head, coming into Jerusalem to address the Knesset, as Sadat did?

Richard Baehr and Ed Lasky   8 02 06