The Iraqi military view of OIF

No combat history is complete until you've heard from both sides in the conflict. This report completes the information loop on Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some of the 100 interviewees include Saddam's personal secretary, commanders of both Republican Guard Corps, the Special Republican Guard commander, and Saddam's director of military intelligence.

Noteworthy items mentioned in the unclassified IPP report include:

Iraqi regime belief that Russia and France would act on behalf of their own economic interests in Iraq to block any U.N. Security Council actions to authorize an invasion;

Fedayeen Saddam planned for attacks in Europe (including London) and the Middle East;

Saddam was more concerned about internal revolt than a coalition invasion. Therefore, bridges were not blown, oil fields were not torched, and the south was not flooded — all part of the inadequate and ineffective military planning done prior to the invasion;

Saddam and his inner circle believed their own propaganda;

Chemical Ali was convinced Iraq no longer had WMD, but many colleagues never stopped believing in them;

Years of U.N. sanctions and coalition bombing had reduced the military effectiveness and usefulness of the Iraqi military forces;

Military and ministry leaders lied to Saddam about the true state of their capabilities;

Iraq military capability was also eroded by irrelevant guidance from the political leadership, creation of "popular" militias, prominent placement of Saddam relatives and sycophants in key leadership positions, and an onerous security apparatus; and

The regime ordered the distribution of ammunition around the country to support a prolonged war with the coalition, but not to support the insurgency or a guerrilla war.

John B. Dwyer   3 26 06

No combat history is complete until you've heard from both sides in the conflict. This report completes the information loop on Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some of the 100 interviewees include Saddam's personal secretary, commanders of both Republican Guard Corps, the Special Republican Guard commander, and Saddam's director of military intelligence.

Noteworthy items mentioned in the unclassified IPP report include:

Iraqi regime belief that Russia and France would act on behalf of their own economic interests in Iraq to block any U.N. Security Council actions to authorize an invasion;

Fedayeen Saddam planned for attacks in Europe (including London) and the Middle East;

Saddam was more concerned about internal revolt than a coalition invasion. Therefore, bridges were not blown, oil fields were not torched, and the south was not flooded — all part of the inadequate and ineffective military planning done prior to the invasion;

Saddam and his inner circle believed their own propaganda;

Chemical Ali was convinced Iraq no longer had WMD, but many colleagues never stopped believing in them;

Years of U.N. sanctions and coalition bombing had reduced the military effectiveness and usefulness of the Iraqi military forces;

Military and ministry leaders lied to Saddam about the true state of their capabilities;

Iraq military capability was also eroded by irrelevant guidance from the political leadership, creation of "popular" militias, prominent placement of Saddam relatives and sycophants in key leadership positions, and an onerous security apparatus; and

The regime ordered the distribution of ammunition around the country to support a prolonged war with the coalition, but not to support the insurgency or a guerrilla war.

John B. Dwyer   3 26 06