The Libyan Chessboard

Several power centers were formed in Libya as a result of the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the destruction of Libyan statehood. None of them has a national legitimacy. The pursuit of personal interests by some political leaders to the detriment of the general state is intertwined with territorial fragmentation. The historic regions -- Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan -- have de facto separated from each other. The Libyan phenomenon of the city-state has arisen (Misrata, Al-Zintan, Sirte, etc.). The separatist tendencies of the tribes has grown stronger.

The UN has attempted to stabilize the situation in the country. In December, 2015, the United Nations brokered the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), the Presidential Council (PC) was set up and a Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj was formed. The agreement also confirmed the legitimacy of the House of Representatives (HoR) based in Tobruk in eastern Libya, while has the support of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the Libyan National Army (LNA) commander.

But the conflict between Islamist, anti-Islamist, secular, tribal, and simply criminal groups which resulted in another civil war is caused by historic, social, economic and political circumstances including the interests and interference of foreign parties and has simply overwhlemed UN efforts. NATO involvement in contravention of UNSC Resolution 1973 turned Libya into a perfect place for terrorist and extremist groups, a center for human trafficking, and a cheap resources market.

Today, the country is de facto divided on the East-West axis. The eastern regions are under LNA control. In early July, Marshal Haftar's troops recaptured Benghazi, partly stabilizing the situation in the East.

Meanwhile, in the West, the tension between the groups allegedly supporting Fayez al-Sarraj's Government of National Accord and those who were loyal to Khalifa al-Ghawil's Government of National Salvation grew into violent clashes. Rival militias have been battling one another heavily in Tripoli since December, 2016.

The south of the once rich and beautiful country became a battlefield for tribes and terrorists on othe the eastern and western sides. Haftar's supporters there were slain by the Misrata-based Third Force militants in early May 2017.

The crisis has been aggravated by various Salafist jihadi groups with different ideologies that are in constant conflict in western Libya. Such groups include Libya Dawn (Libya Fajr), the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, Ansar al-Sharia, the 17 February Martyrs Brigade, the Libya Shield Force, the Libyan Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), etc.

More powerful elements destabilizing the region include ISIS, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Muslim Brotherhood.

A key part in counteracting IS and AQIM belongs to Marshal Haftar, who is taking measures to eliminate jihadists on Libyan soil, near Sabha and Sirte cities in particular. Having lost Sirte, the terrorists dispersed in three directions: to the southwest of Sabha, to the west of Sabratah, and to the southeast near the Sudan border. The main problem of neutralizing these groups is that they are being reinforced with volunteers from Tunis, Algeria, Mali, Chad, and Nigeria and the terrorists fleeing from Syria and Iraq.

However, while the situation in the east has stabilized, the western regions are less stable and prone to changes. Mostly, this is tied to the lack of political will of Sarraj and the GNA, and to the diversity of the ultra-conservative Salafist groups in the west.

Although these opposing factions are nominally loyal to Prime Minister Saraj, experience has shown that they are not associated with any political leader. The most telling example occurred at the end of October 2016, when the forces of Haitham Tajouri, who heads Tripoli’s largest militia and who was allegedly loyal to the Government of National Salvation, allowed the units of Khalifa al-Ghawil to seize a number of ministries in Tripoli. There is also a question concerning the legitimacy of supporting these essentially terrorist formations by Fayez al-Sarraj. Probably, the latter uses them as a force capable in the future to counter the rising popularity of Khalifa Haftar among the population of Libya.

Thus, unlike Prime Minister Saraj, Marshal Haftar is a serious military and political figure on the Libyan chessboard capable of uniting tribes and clans under his banners, limiting the flows of illegal migration to the EU, liquidating the terrorist organizations like ISIS, AKIM and Muslim Brotherhood, thus restoring statehood to the country.

Several power centers were formed in Libya as a result of the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the destruction of Libyan statehood. None of them has a national legitimacy. The pursuit of personal interests by some political leaders to the detriment of the general state is intertwined with territorial fragmentation. The historic regions -- Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan -- have de facto separated from each other. The Libyan phenomenon of the city-state has arisen (Misrata, Al-Zintan, Sirte, etc.). The separatist tendencies of the tribes has grown stronger.

The UN has attempted to stabilize the situation in the country. In December, 2015, the United Nations brokered the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), the Presidential Council (PC) was set up and a Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj was formed. The agreement also confirmed the legitimacy of the House of Representatives (HoR) based in Tobruk in eastern Libya, while has the support of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the Libyan National Army (LNA) commander.

But the conflict between Islamist, anti-Islamist, secular, tribal, and simply criminal groups which resulted in another civil war is caused by historic, social, economic and political circumstances including the interests and interference of foreign parties and has simply overwhlemed UN efforts. NATO involvement in contravention of UNSC Resolution 1973 turned Libya into a perfect place for terrorist and extremist groups, a center for human trafficking, and a cheap resources market.

Today, the country is de facto divided on the East-West axis. The eastern regions are under LNA control. In early July, Marshal Haftar's troops recaptured Benghazi, partly stabilizing the situation in the East.

Meanwhile, in the West, the tension between the groups allegedly supporting Fayez al-Sarraj's Government of National Accord and those who were loyal to Khalifa al-Ghawil's Government of National Salvation grew into violent clashes. Rival militias have been battling one another heavily in Tripoli since December, 2016.

The south of the once rich and beautiful country became a battlefield for tribes and terrorists on othe the eastern and western sides. Haftar's supporters there were slain by the Misrata-based Third Force militants in early May 2017.

The crisis has been aggravated by various Salafist jihadi groups with different ideologies that are in constant conflict in western Libya. Such groups include Libya Dawn (Libya Fajr), the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, Ansar al-Sharia, the 17 February Martyrs Brigade, the Libya Shield Force, the Libyan Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), etc.

More powerful elements destabilizing the region include ISIS, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Muslim Brotherhood.

A key part in counteracting IS and AQIM belongs to Marshal Haftar, who is taking measures to eliminate jihadists on Libyan soil, near Sabha and Sirte cities in particular. Having lost Sirte, the terrorists dispersed in three directions: to the southwest of Sabha, to the west of Sabratah, and to the southeast near the Sudan border. The main problem of neutralizing these groups is that they are being reinforced with volunteers from Tunis, Algeria, Mali, Chad, and Nigeria and the terrorists fleeing from Syria and Iraq.

However, while the situation in the east has stabilized, the western regions are less stable and prone to changes. Mostly, this is tied to the lack of political will of Sarraj and the GNA, and to the diversity of the ultra-conservative Salafist groups in the west.

Although these opposing factions are nominally loyal to Prime Minister Saraj, experience has shown that they are not associated with any political leader. The most telling example occurred at the end of October 2016, when the forces of Haitham Tajouri, who heads Tripoli’s largest militia and who was allegedly loyal to the Government of National Salvation, allowed the units of Khalifa al-Ghawil to seize a number of ministries in Tripoli. There is also a question concerning the legitimacy of supporting these essentially terrorist formations by Fayez al-Sarraj. Probably, the latter uses them as a force capable in the future to counter the rising popularity of Khalifa Haftar among the population of Libya.

Thus, unlike Prime Minister Saraj, Marshal Haftar is a serious military and political figure on the Libyan chessboard capable of uniting tribes and clans under his banners, limiting the flows of illegal migration to the EU, liquidating the terrorist organizations like ISIS, AKIM and Muslim Brotherhood, thus restoring statehood to the country.

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