The Arab Peace Initiative Is a Sow's EarBy Ted Belman
Secretary Kerry hopes to re-energize the peace process by making a silk purse out of the Arab Peace Initiative.
He met with representatives of the Arab League this week and got them to allow for swaps in their demand for Israel to withdraw to the '67 lines. This is in line with President Obama's proposal. Although not in the formal wording of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API), the idea of swaps was mooted when the plan was first introduced and the Arabs were open to the idea so long as the swaps were of equal value and size. Nothing has changed. The idea of swaps has been discussed in all negotiations. But Israel's objection to the API goes way beyond the issue of swaps; it goes to the core idea that Israel must retreat from 100% of the territories, though UNSC Resolution 242 does not require it and Res. 242 is the law.
Nevertheless, Kerry and other administration officials are spinning this as a big deal. At least Kerry reiterated, after the meeting, Obama's vision of "two states living side-by-side in peace and security, brought about through direct negotiations between the parties." That being the case, it only muddies the waters by giving the Arab League a role or defining the goal as '67 lines plus swaps. That is for the parties themselves to decide.
The peace process started with UNSC Res. 242, which called for, in effect, a negotiated settlement and did not require Israel to withdraw from all the territories. It made no attempt to limit how much of the territories Israel could rightly insist on retaining. It did, though, ask for a "just settlement of the refugee problem." This presumably included Jewish refugees from Arab land.
The Arabs totally rejected this resolution and shortly thereafter formalized their rejection in the Khartoum Conference by declaring the three "nos": "no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it."
As a result, the U.S. backed away from the resolution and tabled the Rogers Plan, which required full withdrawal. This plan went nowhere but remained on the table.
In the lead up to the invasion of Iraq and the drafting of the Roadmap, the Saudis, with the complicity of the State Department, launched the Saudi Plan, which required full withdrawal and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. This plan was amended by the Arab League to require "a just solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees." The amended plan became known as the Arab Peace Initiative (API).
It was intended all along that this Plan be inserted in the Roadmap to offset Res. 242. The Roadmap provided:
Thus, the API was put on par with UNSC Resolution 242 as a basis for peace. But the two are inconsistent and in conflict. The API requires full withdrawal and has no legal effect, whereas Res. 242 allows for the retention of land and is legally binding.
Thereafter, the diplomatic community, with one exception -- namely Pres. Bush -- ignored Res. 242 and favored full withdrawal. In 2004, in the lead up to the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, President Bush issued a letter to PM Sharon in which he made no mention of the API but did support the retention of settlement blocs by Israel.
Dore Gold of the JCPA commented on the significance of this letter:
Thus, the Clinton Parameters were much in line with the Saudi Plan, and the Bush letter flew in the face of both of these and resorted to Resolution 242 only, which provided the original parameters of Oslo.
President Obama disavowed this letter and insisted that the settlement be based on the "'67 lines" with swaps. And now the Arab League has given him their support.
It may well be that such endorsement will give Mahmoud Abbas cover to enter negotiations, but that's all. Israel will never accept the proposal and will insist on no preconditions to the talks.
The chances of reaching an agreement in the talks are remote, and more likely nonexistent. Why?
Partial withdrawal vs. full withdrawal
Israel has already withdrawn from Sinai and Gaza, which amount to 90% of the territories. It is not unreasonable for Israel to expect to keep 10% of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), which is only 1% of the originally conquered territories. This would allow Israel to keep all of its settlement blocs, including Maaleh Adumin, a city of 40,000 citizens (including E1) and Ariel, a city of 20,000 residents and 15,000 students. It would allow Israel to also double its mid-drift from 9 km to 18 km. Yet the Arabs are offering 0% plus swaps.
The Arabs, supported by the U.S., are demanding that the eastern part of Jerusalem be the capital of their state to be. To justify their demand, they claim that "the historical ties and attachments of Palestinians" to Jerusalem "precede any Jewish claim to it." This is nonsense.
Morton Klein, President of ZOA, writes in "The Historic Jewish east Jerusalem":
Klein makes reference to a "powerful but little-known book, Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century, by the distinguished Israeli historian, Yehoshua Ben-Arieh:
This history cannot be ignored, and thus, Israel will demand that Jerusalem remain the undivided capital of Israel.
Right of Return
There is no such right. UNGA resolution 196 calling for a just settlement of the refugee issue is only a recommendation. Israel has never agreed to this recommendation.
Res. 242 granted Israel the right to hold out for secure boundaries. The Clinton Parameters substituted "security guarantees" for secure boundaries, but such guarantees have never been upheld when the going gets tough. Contrary to security guarantees given to Israel over the years, 1) the U.N. permitted Hezb'allah to re-arm; 2) the Rafi Crossing into Gaza was to be managed by the EU to prevent weapons entering Gaza after the Israeli disengagement; it was soon thereafter abandoned by the EU, and the weapons flowed into Gaza; and 3) the four great powers guaranteed to Israel after the '56 War that the Straits of Tiran would be open to her, but when Nasser closed them prior to the '67 War, they did nothing. Many more examples can be cited. Thus, Israel has learned the lesson that she can rely only on herself.
Unfortunately for Israel, the U.S. is throwing her weight behind the Arab demands and ignoring history, law, and morality in so doing. That makes the Arabs less likely to compromise and a peace agreement less likely to be obtained.
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