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October 7, 2009 Gen. Stanley McChrystal: Unconventional Warrior, Unconventional PoliticianBy Tom Suhadolnik
There are 1.5 million men and women serving in the US military. Above them are only 41 four star generals. You simply cannot rise to the top of the most brutal up-or-out meritocracy on the planet without mastering the arts of war and politics. General Stanley McChrystal, the four star general tapped by Obama to run the war in Afghanistan, is no exception.
When it is reported insiders believe McChrystal is either "naïve or an upstart", it is evidence top political thinkers in the administration don't realize McChrystal is playing on a different level. If you had to sum up Stanley McChrystal in one word it would be unconventional. McChrystal has spent most of his career in Special Operations. Before heading to Afghanistan in the spring of 2009, he commanded the Joint Special Operations Command for five years. Every non-conventional warrior in the US military -- Navy SEAL, Army Green Beret, Delta Force, you name it -- was either directly or nominally under his command. McChrystal's unconventional military experience may be why he approaches political problems in a manner foreign to DC insiders. Since earning his first star in January 2001 he has faced three potentially career-ending imbroglios. The first political grenade handed to McChrystal was the Pat Tillman fiasco. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 Pat Tillman left a multi-million dollar contract with the Arizona Cardinals to join the Army. Tillman was then killed in Afghanistan. At first, the official story was Tillman died heroically during combat with the Taliban. Years later the Army publicly admitted Tillman died in a friendly fire incident. Long before the friendly fire story become public, McChrystal recommended Tillman for a posthumous Silver Star. At the same time he recommended the Silver Star, McChrystal sent a memo via back channels to President Bush advising him avoid talking about the incident. McChrysthal told Bush he had suspicions Tillman was killed by friendly fire. The truth emerged that McChrystal's public and private statements were at odds, and the media pounced. Not only had he misled the media, his back channel memo was the type of protocol breach official Washington despises. But the long knives never found McChrystal; he managed to protect his career, boost troop morale and keep his commander in chief from taking any heat. When McChrystal testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2009, many expected he would face tough questions on the Tillman affair. Those expecting a typical Washington mea culpa were disappointed. Regarding the Tillman affair McChrystal said:
The New York Daily News summed up McChrystal's statements Tillman this way:
But the general, who commanded the super secret Joint Special Operations Command then, denied the phony narrative of a raging firefight was anything more sinister than "mistakes" made to honor the famous GI. "They were well-intentioned" but created "doubt and the sense of mistrust," he told the Armed Services Committee. The second political grenade tossed into McChrystal's lap was how to dealing with detained terrorists in the Kill-Them-All-Let-God-Sort-Them-Out national mood following September 11th. If suspected terrorists were whisked out of foreign countries, sent to a network of secret prisons, handed over to regimes known to torture or simply assassinated, McChrystal's people were likely involved. McChrystal makes no apologies for doing things to prisoners that many would consider torture. There have been many credible reports that detainees were abused (and perhaps killed) by soldiers under his command during the early days of the Iraq War. To many on the left, what McChrystal knowingly authorized makes Abu Gharib look like summer camp. If Code Pink has a top ten American war criminals list McChrystal is near the top. McChrystal dealt with this issue most recently in June 2009 when testifiying before the Senate:
McChrystal is now holding his third political grenade. Even before he was tapped to run the War in Afghanistan, it was common knowledge that success in Afghanistan might require more troops. If the administration expects him to fight this battle like a more conventional general -- think Colin Powel or Brent Scowcroft for instance -- they will be disappointed.
on "Gen. Stanley McChrystal: Unconventional Warrior, Unconventional Politician"
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