The Price of 'Realism'

In early April, newly sworn-in Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman made waves during his first speech as Foreign Minister when he announced that Israel is not obligated by agreements reached at the Annapolis Conference. Israel is only obligated, he said, to abide by the Road Map and its terms must be followed precisely and in order. While these two plans for Israeli-Palestinian peace have the same goal of a two-state solution, they go about achieving those aims through very different methods. 

The Roadmap was presented by President Bush to Prime Minister Sharon and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in April of 2003, and the Israeli government subsequently adopted the document albeit with fourteen reservations. The U.S.-backed peace proposal set a series of benchmarks designed to move Israelis and Palestinians over a three-year period to the creation of a Palestinian state that would exist in peace with Israel.

Basically, the document envisioned a bottom-up performance-based series of confidence-building measures taking place step-by-step in three phases.

First and foremost, the agreement required that Israeli security demands be met. That involved the Palestinians ending terrorism and incitement against Israel, dismantling terrorist organizations, conducting comprehensive political reforms in preparation for responsible statehood, and recognizing Israel's right to exist in peace and security. For its part, Israel was to ease restrictions on the movement of people and goods, withdraw from Palestinian areas occupied after September 28, 2000, freeze settlement construction, and dismantle settlement "outposts" erected after March 2001.

The second stage involved establishing a Palestinian state within temporary boundaries, and the third involved final status negotiations on the "core issues" of permanent borders of a Palestinian state, refugees, settlements, determining the status of Jerusalem, and international recognition for both Palestine and Israel.

In letters exchanged in April 2004 between Bush and Sharon, Bush confirmed that "Palestinians must undertake an immediate cessation of armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere, and all official Palestinian institutions must end incitement against Israel." He also confirmed that the Palestinians "had to act decisively against terror by dismantling terrorist capabilities and infrastructures" and to undertake "comprehensive and fundamental political reforms." In the letter, he recognized as well that existing major Israeli population centers on the West Bank prevented "a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949" meaning that a future Israeli-Palestinian land-swap could not be ruled out. The difficult "core issues" in Phase 3 however, would be left to the final phase of the settlement. That is, the Palestinians first had to prove by their actions and in accordance with established benchmarks that they accepted Israel's right to live in peace and security as a pre-condition to dealing with the "final status issues."

The Annapolis Declaration of November 2007, however, turned the Roadmap on its head. It envisioned a top-down process primarily because the majority of Palestinians had no desire to fulfill their Phase 1 Roadmap responsibilities concerning terrorism. Annapolis attempted to reverse the process by demanding that the Phase 3 "final status issues" of the Roadmap be negotiated first.

President Bush once said that a "Palestinian state will never be created by terror" yet, at Annapolis, he insisted that a Palestinian state should be created regardless of terror. Apparently, President Obama agrees. The problem is that the years of intifada that followed the failure at Camp David in July 2000, not to mention decades of Palestinian deceit and terror have deepened the chasm of disagreement over these Phase 3 issues. If the Israelis balk at a two-state solution, their hesitation is based on the reasonable assumption that such a state would, in the end, be controlled by terrorists and would represent an existential threat to their country.

While the US would never countenance a terrorist state contiguous to the continental United States, at Annapolis, it had no qualms in requiring Israel to accept such a threat. No wonder Israel is worried.

Changing the emphasis from the bottom-up, performance-based terms of the Roadmap to the top-down Annapolis process brings to the fore the essence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A two-state solution cannot come to pass unless and until the Arab world reconciles itself to the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East. Since neither Fatah nor Hamas have shown any inclination to do so, their failure must preclude any discussion on the other "final status issues" set forth in the Roadmap.

More to the point, both Palestinian organizations are ideologically committed to the annihilation of the Jewish state. And they are not alone.

According to a recent Norwegian poll taken by the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, 33 percent of Palestinians seek the annihilation of the Jewish state, whether by political means or by force of arms - to be replaced by a single Islamic republic, and another 20 percent favor a united Israeli-Palestinian state, to be eventually engulfed by the latter population. The PLO Charter still demands the destruction of the Israel while that of Hamas calls for jihad against Israel and the Jewish people.

Acknowledging the right of Israel to exist as a sovereign state in the Middle East would mean acceptance of Jewish historical and biblical ties to the land, and this, the majority of Palestinians are not prepared to do.

The reality is that Israel's enemies feel no need to hide their true intentions, and certainly have no incentive to do so given Israel's treatment as a pariah by the Arab and Muslim world.

Into this fray comes an Israeli Foreign Minister who has the chutzpah to tell the world that he intends to put the Palestinians "feet to the fire" by insisting that they comply precisely with Phase 1 of the Roadmap (ending terrorism, dismantling terrorist infrastructures, ending incitement to terrorism, establishing a stable, responsible civilian government and recognizing Israel) despite the fact that the majority of Palestinians see terrorism as a legitimate form of "resistance" and continue to seek Israel's destruction.

Yet, by supporting the Roadmap and demanding it be strictly implemented, Lieberman has become an international pariah - a man "beyond the pale", a "hawkish nationalist," an "ultranationalist" and, for good measure, "a racist." Former US ambassador to Israel Dan Kurtzer, a long-standing Obama Middle East adviser, warned that "a government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu which included Avigdor Lieberman would be a bad combination for American interests" which would be loath to "embrace a government that included a politician who was defined as a racist."

But are Lieberman's demands so unreasonable? Whatever happened to the premise that terrorists must be defeated and the swamps that breed them had to be drained? A return to Annapolis would mean that the policy enshrined in the Roadmap no longer matters and is to be replaced by another policy less focused on achieving peace than on maintaining the appearance of a peace "process."

In the near future, Israel can expect increasing pressure from the Obama administration to "accept" a two-state solution in the first instance - that is, a return to the Annapolis Declaration - even though the majority of Palestinians and Israelis, albeit for entirely different reasons, have rejected it. Perhaps Lieberman did not go far enough in explaining his government's position. It would have been far better had he clarified the Israeli position to the Palestinians, the Europeans, and to President Obama in less diplomatic terms -- perhaps something like this:

"Tell you what, if you recognize Israel as a sovereign state in the Middle East, prove you are dismantling your terrorist infrastructures, stop sending your suicide bombers into our cities, towns and marketplaces, stop inciting hatred and spreading blood libels through your media, your mosques, your educational system and throughout your society, stop brainwashing your children into believing that the fast track to virgins in Paradise requires them to become human grenades and to murder as many Jews as possible, stop firing missiles at us, and cease behaving like a failed, terrorist state, then we'll come to the table with a settlement offer that will bring both our societies peace and prosperity." 

Sound reasonable? Absolutely. Is that going to happen any time soon? Don't hold your breath.
In early April, newly sworn-in Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman made waves during his first speech as Foreign Minister when he announced that Israel is not obligated by agreements reached at the Annapolis Conference. Israel is only obligated, he said, to abide by the Road Map and its terms must be followed precisely and in order. While these two plans for Israeli-Palestinian peace have the same goal of a two-state solution, they go about achieving those aims through very different methods. 

The Roadmap was presented by President Bush to Prime Minister Sharon and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in April of 2003, and the Israeli government subsequently adopted the document albeit with fourteen reservations. The U.S.-backed peace proposal set a series of benchmarks designed to move Israelis and Palestinians over a three-year period to the creation of a Palestinian state that would exist in peace with Israel.

Basically, the document envisioned a bottom-up performance-based series of confidence-building measures taking place step-by-step in three phases.

First and foremost, the agreement required that Israeli security demands be met. That involved the Palestinians ending terrorism and incitement against Israel, dismantling terrorist organizations, conducting comprehensive political reforms in preparation for responsible statehood, and recognizing Israel's right to exist in peace and security. For its part, Israel was to ease restrictions on the movement of people and goods, withdraw from Palestinian areas occupied after September 28, 2000, freeze settlement construction, and dismantle settlement "outposts" erected after March 2001.

The second stage involved establishing a Palestinian state within temporary boundaries, and the third involved final status negotiations on the "core issues" of permanent borders of a Palestinian state, refugees, settlements, determining the status of Jerusalem, and international recognition for both Palestine and Israel.

In letters exchanged in April 2004 between Bush and Sharon, Bush confirmed that "Palestinians must undertake an immediate cessation of armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere, and all official Palestinian institutions must end incitement against Israel." He also confirmed that the Palestinians "had to act decisively against terror by dismantling terrorist capabilities and infrastructures" and to undertake "comprehensive and fundamental political reforms." In the letter, he recognized as well that existing major Israeli population centers on the West Bank prevented "a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949" meaning that a future Israeli-Palestinian land-swap could not be ruled out. The difficult "core issues" in Phase 3 however, would be left to the final phase of the settlement. That is, the Palestinians first had to prove by their actions and in accordance with established benchmarks that they accepted Israel's right to live in peace and security as a pre-condition to dealing with the "final status issues."

The Annapolis Declaration of November 2007, however, turned the Roadmap on its head. It envisioned a top-down process primarily because the majority of Palestinians had no desire to fulfill their Phase 1 Roadmap responsibilities concerning terrorism. Annapolis attempted to reverse the process by demanding that the Phase 3 "final status issues" of the Roadmap be negotiated first.

President Bush once said that a "Palestinian state will never be created by terror" yet, at Annapolis, he insisted that a Palestinian state should be created regardless of terror. Apparently, President Obama agrees. The problem is that the years of intifada that followed the failure at Camp David in July 2000, not to mention decades of Palestinian deceit and terror have deepened the chasm of disagreement over these Phase 3 issues. If the Israelis balk at a two-state solution, their hesitation is based on the reasonable assumption that such a state would, in the end, be controlled by terrorists and would represent an existential threat to their country.

While the US would never countenance a terrorist state contiguous to the continental United States, at Annapolis, it had no qualms in requiring Israel to accept such a threat. No wonder Israel is worried.

Changing the emphasis from the bottom-up, performance-based terms of the Roadmap to the top-down Annapolis process brings to the fore the essence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A two-state solution cannot come to pass unless and until the Arab world reconciles itself to the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East. Since neither Fatah nor Hamas have shown any inclination to do so, their failure must preclude any discussion on the other "final status issues" set forth in the Roadmap.

More to the point, both Palestinian organizations are ideologically committed to the annihilation of the Jewish state. And they are not alone.

According to a recent Norwegian poll taken by the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, 33 percent of Palestinians seek the annihilation of the Jewish state, whether by political means or by force of arms - to be replaced by a single Islamic republic, and another 20 percent favor a united Israeli-Palestinian state, to be eventually engulfed by the latter population. The PLO Charter still demands the destruction of the Israel while that of Hamas calls for jihad against Israel and the Jewish people.

Acknowledging the right of Israel to exist as a sovereign state in the Middle East would mean acceptance of Jewish historical and biblical ties to the land, and this, the majority of Palestinians are not prepared to do.

The reality is that Israel's enemies feel no need to hide their true intentions, and certainly have no incentive to do so given Israel's treatment as a pariah by the Arab and Muslim world.

Into this fray comes an Israeli Foreign Minister who has the chutzpah to tell the world that he intends to put the Palestinians "feet to the fire" by insisting that they comply precisely with Phase 1 of the Roadmap (ending terrorism, dismantling terrorist infrastructures, ending incitement to terrorism, establishing a stable, responsible civilian government and recognizing Israel) despite the fact that the majority of Palestinians see terrorism as a legitimate form of "resistance" and continue to seek Israel's destruction.

Yet, by supporting the Roadmap and demanding it be strictly implemented, Lieberman has become an international pariah - a man "beyond the pale", a "hawkish nationalist," an "ultranationalist" and, for good measure, "a racist." Former US ambassador to Israel Dan Kurtzer, a long-standing Obama Middle East adviser, warned that "a government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu which included Avigdor Lieberman would be a bad combination for American interests" which would be loath to "embrace a government that included a politician who was defined as a racist."

But are Lieberman's demands so unreasonable? Whatever happened to the premise that terrorists must be defeated and the swamps that breed them had to be drained? A return to Annapolis would mean that the policy enshrined in the Roadmap no longer matters and is to be replaced by another policy less focused on achieving peace than on maintaining the appearance of a peace "process."

In the near future, Israel can expect increasing pressure from the Obama administration to "accept" a two-state solution in the first instance - that is, a return to the Annapolis Declaration - even though the majority of Palestinians and Israelis, albeit for entirely different reasons, have rejected it. Perhaps Lieberman did not go far enough in explaining his government's position. It would have been far better had he clarified the Israeli position to the Palestinians, the Europeans, and to President Obama in less diplomatic terms -- perhaps something like this:

"Tell you what, if you recognize Israel as a sovereign state in the Middle East, prove you are dismantling your terrorist infrastructures, stop sending your suicide bombers into our cities, towns and marketplaces, stop inciting hatred and spreading blood libels through your media, your mosques, your educational system and throughout your society, stop brainwashing your children into believing that the fast track to virgins in Paradise requires them to become human grenades and to murder as many Jews as possible, stop firing missiles at us, and cease behaving like a failed, terrorist state, then we'll come to the table with a settlement offer that will bring both our societies peace and prosperity." 

Sound reasonable? Absolutely. Is that going to happen any time soon? Don't hold your breath.