November 14, 2006
Hezb'allah's End Game in Lebanon Taking ShapeBy Rick Moran
With the resignation of 5 Hezb'allah and Amal cabinet ministers following the breakdown of the National Dialogue talks last weekend, the tiny nation of Lebanon may be on a downward spiral toward civil strife or worse — a wave of violence that would threaten the stability and safety of the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.
It is impossible to overstate the danger to the fragile democratic coalition that took power with such high hopes in the summer of 2005 as a result of millions of ordinary Lebanese taking to the streets demanding an independent Lebanon free from Syrian control. But despite the removal of Syrian troops and the ouster of the hated Damascus—controlled Secret Police, the March 14th Forces have been unable to deal effectively with Syria's armed proxy Hezb'allah, whose tentacles have now encircled the neck of the Lebanese government and have begun to squeeze.
Hezb'allah's spiritual and political leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah seems to have played his cards perfectly. From making the decision to join the government rather than remain outside of it back in 2005 to his current power play against Siniora's cabinet, Nasrallah has proven himself a canny politician with the instincts of a predator and the nerve of a riverboat gambler. And nowhere was his nerve on display more than last summer when he deliberately provoked the Israelis into a war that he guessed would do more damage to the fragile government of Lebanon than to his own armed militia of fanatical followers.
He guessed correctly.
While the Israelis tentatively attacked Hezb'allah positions on the border — positions long prepared to inflict maximum casualties on the Israeli Defense Forces — every day that Hezb'allah remained an effective fighting force was a victory for Nasrallah and his 'resistance,' raising the level of popular support among ordinary Lebanese of all sects. Simply the act of starting the war made Nasrallah de facto head of government. His pronouncements during the conflict made it seem that he considered Prime Minister Siniora little more than an errand boy who, with his permission, could negotiate for prisoner exchanges but little else.
Siniora's hands were tied. Faced with massive bombing of his country that was systematically destroying much of Lebanon's infrastructure, and given that the Lebanese Army was virtually useless to resist Israeli forces, Siniora acquiesced in Nasrallah's temporary ascendancy. The rest of the March 14th Forces were placed on the defensive as a result of the bombing and Israeli incursion. After some initial criticism of Nasrallah taking the country to war without the government's approval, most coalition leaders remained relatively quiet, preferring to let events play themselves out.
Within weeks of the UN—brokered peace deal, Nasrallah began his play for power, starting with calls by his partner, ex—Prime Minister and head of the mostly Christian Free Patriotic Movement Michel Aoun, for a 'government of national unity.' He accused the Siniora government of corruption and incompetence while calling for more Shia representation in the cabinet. Aoun, whose naked ambition to replace Syrian puppet President Emile Lahoud has driven him into his unlikely alliance with the Shias, has proven himself a thorn in the side of the March 14th forces ever since his return from exile in the days following the Syrian exit from Lebanon.
Throughout the fall, as tensions in the country rose, the March 14th Forces resisted calls for the National Dialogue to take up the issue of a unity government and Shia representation. In the end, it became apparent that the only way to head off civil strife was to convene a group of leaders from all parts of Lebanese society to determine if a compromise could be achieved. They sat down last week for talks in what was described as a 'tense and cold' atmosphere.
Of course, Nasrallah was not looking for compromise. He was looking not only to expand Shia representation in the cabinet so that he had absolute veto power over actions taken by the majority March 14 Forces, but also to head off cabinet discussion of the formation of an International Tribunal to try the perpetrators of the assassination of ex—Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. That Tribunal will probably indict high level members of the Syrian government as well as several prominent Syrian allies in Lebanon.
For the majority's part, they no more wanted Hezb'allah in the driver's seat than Nasrallah wanted a political settlement. By offering to grant Hezb'allah their expanded cabinet representation, the March 14th Forces added a poison pill to the deal: the new Shia ministers would be forced to sign off on approval of the Tribunal.
That ended the National Dialogue and caused the resignation of the Hezb'allah and Amal ministers (as well as the pro—President Lahoud environmental minister). In a tactical move to buy time, Prime Minister Siniora has rejected the resignations out of hand and declared that the Shias were still members of the cabinet. Under Lebanese law, if one of the various sects removes themselves or is thrown out of the government, no major issues can be decided by the cabinet.
By rejecting the Shia resignations, Siniora is gambling that another round of talks will produce a compromise more palatable to the majority while heading off a possible civil war. And yesterday, his cabinet approved the UN Tribunal despite the absence of the Shia ministers. It is unclear at this point whether the cabinet's actions have the force of law or not.
Nasrallah could probably care less if the cabinet's actions were legal. He's got what he wants; a cabinet crisis and fears of renewed civil war. He holds the whip hand on both counts and now must decide his next move. Does he allow the ministers to rejoin the cabinet with the proviso that discussion of the Tribunal is off the table? Or does he force the issue through street demonstrations that will almost certainly devolve into confrontations with armed militias opposed to him?
The answer is perhaps both. In a statement released yesterday, Hezb'allah announced that there would indeed be 'peaceful' street demonstrations but that the 'timing of the action had not been decided.' Nasrallah may want the political pressure to build on the March 14th Forces to see if they can be convinced to give him what he wants with no strings attached. At the same time, his threat to send his highly trained, fanatical militia into the streets could be seen as a powerful sign that his patience has its limits.
In fact, Nasrallah seems confident that he will get what he wants soon — one way or another.
A key figure emerging in the crisis is Speaker Nabih Berri. Surprising some observers, Berri has called the cabinet's approval of the Tribunal
Whether this leaves the door open for genuine compromise could become clearer once Nasrallah makes his next move.
Speculation on what Masrallah's next move might be has centered on the Parliament, where Nasrallah controls around 60 of the 128 member body. If, as some speculate, the next act in the crisis would be for Shia, Amal, and Free Patriotic Movement MP's to resign from Parliament, the country would almost certainly be thrown into chaos. This would make it impossible for Siniora's cabinet to maintain any semblance of legitimacy and calls for new elections would almost certainly be in the offing.
Mid—East expert Walid Phares plays out this scenario:
What it comes down to is what has always been the greatest threat to Lebanon's democracy: Hezb'allah and its guns. Failing to disarm the militia as they were required to do under UN Security Council resolution 1559, the March 14th Forces paid for their inability to rally enough popular support to suppress Hezb'allah, first with the Israeli War and now with an existential threat to a free and independent Lebanon. Perhaps it was inevitable given the enormous difficulty in governing a country so riven with factional and sectarian divisions. But history's judgment will be no less severe if the small group of brave democrats cannot find a way to stop Nasrallah from carrying through his plans.
As for the United States, there is very little we can do to assist. Siniora is already battling charges that he is Washington's stooge — charges that ring true with many ordinary Lebanese, thanks to effective Hezb'allah propaganda spewed forth from Al—Manar, the terrorist media organ in Lebanon. And as Dr. Phares points out, Nasrallah's push for power has not taken place in a political vacuum; both he and his patrons in Tehran and Syria know how to read US election results:
Lebanon is entering a period of enormous tension and trial, the results being difficult to predict at this point. What seems clear is that the forces for freedom and independence are facing their greatest challenge and that the next few days and weeks will determine their fate and the fate of their tiny country for many years to come.
Rick Moran is the proprietor of Rightwing Nuthouse and a frequent contributor to American Thinker.