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June 18, 2004 Deconstructing the Iraq - 9/11 non-connectionBy Dennis SevakisReaders of certain spy novels, such as those of John Le Carre, are familiar with the art of misdirection in the realm of cloak—and—dagger secret operations. Truth itself is often fiction. Little, if anything, is what it seems. No such subtlety for the 9/11 Commission. No siree, Bob! A few simple facts tell the whole story and that's all there is to it. See, for example, the second paragraph on page eight of Staff Statement no. 16, "Outline of the 9/11 Plot": If you're being watched or think there's a possibility, just make sure the paper or electronic trail accurately traces every step. Isn't it possible that this fine, upstanding person would use a false passport to exit and reenter the country —— thus covering his movements and preventing revelation of his meeting with Iraqi intelligence? He wouldn't do that, would he? What was the $8,000 used for? Couldn't be a round—trip to Prague and back, could it? Guess not. Mneimneh, the Iraqi document expert, says that there are other reasons to discount the handwritten memo touted by the Telegraph. The document includes another sensational second item: how Iraqi intelligence, helped by a "small team from the Al Qaeda organization," arranged for a shipment from Niger to reach Iraq by way of Libya and Syria. . .. Mneimneh says the wording of the document makes him highly suspicious: Iraqi intelligence officials were notoriously conservative and rarely —— if ever —— put incriminating information in writing. The reference to the Iraqi intelligence working with a "small team from the Al Qaeda organization" is "too explicit," he says. But why is this too explicit? After all, those silly Iranians broadcast in the exact same code that they had just learned had been broken, that it had been broken! Isn't that also 'too explicit'? But everyone seems to believe the Iranians' too explicit communications, when it comes to discrediting Chalabi. And it couldn't possibly be that those Iraqis would ever think one step beyond the obvious, by planting an obvious satetment that no one would believe because it was obvious? Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute seems to think like Le Carre. His National Review Online article makes a pretty good case that most intelligence information that gets 'leaked' about an individual is just plain false. That the U.S. should discover or be given documents that are meant to mislead should not come as a surprise. That one way of doing this is to state the truth openly, thereby having it be dismissed as 'too explicit' doesn't seem too great a stretch. So why would Atta having someone else use his cell phone for a few days and using a false passport be so ridiculous a notion that we can axiomatically discount his trip to Prague? Beats me —— and also author Edward J. Epstein . on "Deconstructing the Iraq - 9/11 non-connection"
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